Assistant Surgeon Captain Charles B. Ewing’s Report to Major General Miles

Posted on August 12, 2013 by Sam Russell

In June 1891, Captain Charles B. Ewing, Assistant Surgeon, Department of the Platte, at the request of Major General Nelson A. Miles, Commanding General, Division of Missouri, submitted the following report to the Adjutant General of the Division of Missouri, Chicago, Illinois.

June 23, 1891

Sir:–Understanding that a report of my services at the battle of Wounded Knee is desired, I have the honor to submit the following:

The battle began at 9:30 A.M., December 29, 1890, and the troops withdrew from the field about 2 P.M., and marched to Pine Ridge Agency, reaching that point sometime between 9:30 and 10 o’clock that evening.

Lieutenant Kinzie, Second United States Infantry, Mr. James Assay, Indian trader at Pine Ridge agency, and myself, were seated in an open wagon within ten to fifteen feet of one end of the parallelogram of soldiers that surrounded the Minneconjous Sioux band under Big Foot.

Colonel Forsyth, Seventh United States Cavalry, was writing a communication which one of our party was to carry to General Brooke, commanding Department of the Platte, then at Pine Ridge agency, and while waiting for communication, the firing commenced.  A volley came in our direction, the bullets whistling unpleasantly about us; our horses took fright, and, becoming uncontrollable, ran right across the line of fire, but were turned, and finally stopped near Louis Mossoeu’s store, about three hundred yards distant from the field of battle; we alighted, and I was then informed by Lieutenant Kinzie that he had been shot in the foot; after examination of the same, I immediately returned to the camp and busied myself in the care of the wounded.

I did not think it a time for ceremony, hence dispensed with the formality of reporting for duty, and at once went to work.  The work consisted principally of what is known as first aid to the wounded.  The only exception being an operation of a plastic nature, when I replaced and stitched the severed nose of Mr. Wells, the interpreter, belonging to Lieutenant Taylor’s command of Indian scouts.  This was the only operation, if my memory serves me, that was performed on the field.

This first aid consisted in stopping haemorrhage; applying dressing to wounds; putting up fractures; giving stimulants; and allaying pain.  Later it became necessary to redress many of the wounds, as is often the case, the first dressing being only temporary.

I accompanied Captain Edgerly’s troop to a point about three miles to the west, where Captain Jackson was reported to be surrounded by hostile Brulés.  Truth forbids that I place this in the light of a medical service, and I freely confess that it was only after arriving at our destination that I was aware that I lacked everything in the way of dressings to render aid to the wounded in case of trouble; of course, much could be done in that regard by using the clothing and equipment of the men.  My only excuse is that I went very suddenly, so quickly in fact that there was no time for obtaining dressings.  It was in this way: I was standing on the brow of the hill watching the firing of the Hotchkiss guns and the barricading of the ridge when Captain Edgerly’s troop galloped past, and seeing a horse in the troop without a rider, I ran out and jumped in the saddle.  I had provided myself with carbine and ammunition, hence was in good shape.  It did not take us more than fifteen minutes to ride the three miles, and we were just in time to see the Indians disappear in the direction of Pine Ridge agency.  After remaining about fifteen or twenty minutes, I suddenly remembered that I had absolutely nothing in the way of dressings, hence returned to camp with Lieutenant Brewer for the purpose of obtaining some, but learning that the command was to return immediately, I found my services would not be needed, hence did not obtain dressings as I intended doing.

Now to sum up: I was on the field from 9:30 A.M. to about 4 P.M., at which hour we began our march back to the agency.  Of that six and one-half hours, I am quite sure I spent two and one-half to three hours at the dressing station, and the same length of time superintending the removal of a part of the wounded and at least three-fourths of the dead, to which must be added about three-quarters of an hour taken up in accompanying Captain Edgerly’s command and returning as stated above.

We consumed about five and one-half hours on the march to the agency, which was of necessity slow.  I rode a horse (kindly furnished me by a troop commander), as did also Assistant Surgeons Hoff and Glennan.  I did not render any medical service on the march, and think it quite unlikely that such could have been rendered efficiently, as darkness came on quickly and lights were not permitted in the command.  I was not called upon to render any aid by the surgeon officially in charge, and I fail to see, under the conditions, how the wounded could have been benefited further till arrival at division hospital.  I would be failing in a proper appreciation of the work of my brother surgeons in the connection were I not to mention the very efficient and untiring services of Captain Van R. Hoff and Lieutenant Glennan, of the Medical Department, who labored unceasingly in ministering to the wounded.  Upon arriving at Pine Ridge agency, the wounded were placed in that part of the divisional field hospital of which I was in charge.  It was my duty to attend and redress some twenty of the wounded, which occupied my time till two o’clock the following morning.

Capt. C. B. Ewing. Assistant Surgeon

Source: George B. Shattuck, ed., The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal, Volume CXXVI, January – June 1892, (Boston: Damrell and Upham, 1892), 463-464.

Citation for this article: Samuel L. Russell, “Assistant Surgeon Captain Charles B. Ewing’s Report to Major General Miles,” Army at Wounded Knee (Sumter, SC: Russell Martial Research, 2013-2015, http://wp.me/p3NoJy-1P), posted 12 Aug 2013, accessed date __________.

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Col. Forsyth’s Official Reports of Actions at Wounded Knee

Posted on August 9, 2013 by Sam Russell

…the bucks made a break, which at once resulted in terrific fire and a hot fight lasting about twenty minutes, followed by skirmish firing of about one hour.

Col. James W. Forsyth, 7th Cavalry, at Pine Ridge Agency, 16 Jan. 1891

Col. James W. Forsyth, 7th Cavalry, at Pine Ridge Agency, 16 Jan. 1891, cropped from John C. H. Grabil’s “Fighting Seventh Officers.”

Colonel James William Forsyth, the fifty-six-year-old commander of the 7th Cavalry Regiment submitted three field reports concerning his actions surrounding Wounded Knee.  Each of these reports were submitted as evidence during the investigation that Major General Miles convened on 6 January 1891.  The first report he rendered on the eve of the battle upon reaching Major Whitside’s camp near the Wounded Knee Creek post office.

Hdqtrs. Camp 7th Cavalry,
Wounded Knee, S. D.,
December 28, 1890.
8:30 P.M.

Actg Adjt. General,
Dept. of the Platte, in the field,
Pine Ridge Agency, So. Dak.

Sir:
I have the honor to report that I reached here with my command at 8:30 P.M.
Found everything in perfect condition.  The Comdg Gen’l’s orders will be carried out in the morning, or as soon thereafter as possible.  I will report back to him, with the battalion I brought out with me.
Rations for 400 Indians should be sent here to-morrow as early as possible, with the forage train, the General said he intended to send.  I find that Major Whitside has been obliged to call in from the troops rations to feed these Indians to-day.
I trust that the rations and forage train will be pushed here rapidly to-morrow morning.
I cannot now say at what time I will reach the agency on my return to-morrow, but no time will be lost.
Very respectfully, Your obdt servant,
James W. Forsyth,
Colonel 7th Cavalry, Commanding.

Forsyth sent a second message on 29 December following the initial melee surrounding the council circle and while his troops continued the pursuit and annihilation of Big Foot’s band up the ravine and into the hills.

Wounded Knee, S. D., December 29th, 1890.

General Brooke:
On attempting to disarm the persons of the bucks, they made a break, which resulted in a hot fight, lasting from about 9:15 until about 9:45.  About 15 soldiers are wounded and a few killed.  The number of Indians killed and wounded not known, but believed to exceed the loss on our side.  The ones who escaped have fled up the ravines to the west, pursued by three troops.
Lieut. Garlington is shot through the arm–not a dangerous wound.  This dispatch is indefinite but is as accurate as I can give, as we are still engaged clearing out the ravine.
Very respectfully, Your obdt servant,
James W. Forsyth
Colonel 7th Cavalry, Commanding.

Later: Captain Wallace is killed.

Forsyth’s third report from Wounded Knee concerned Captain Henry Jackson’s troop being attacked by Indians from the agency who came out to the sounds of the battle.

Wounded Knee, S. D., December 29th, 1890
1:30 P.M.

General Brooke:
Capt. Jackson, in pursuing the escaping Indians, overtook them and captured twenty-three.  Almost immediately after five Indians approached from the direction of the agency and had the appearance of belonging to the agency police.  After shaking hands with all the officers, they rode back a short distance, and evidently at a signal about 150 Indians opened fire on him, and in the running fight the captured Indians escaped.
He then returned to the command.
Am preparing to start for the agency now.
Very respectfully, Your obdt servant,
James W. Forsyth,
Colonel 7th Cavalry Comdg,

P.S.–If seven ambulances could be sent out to meet us, it would make the moving of the wounded more easy to them.

Colonel Forsyth submitted his official report of the battle on 31 December, the day after the battle on White Clay Creek and two days after Wounded Knee.

Camp Pine Ridge Agency,
December 31, 1890.

Acting Assistant Adjutant General,
Headquarters Department of the Platte,
In the field,

Sir:–I have the honor to report the following in connection with the movements of my command on the night of December 28th and during the following day.
Pursuant to verbal orders from the Commanding General of the Department, I moved my command from this point to the crossing of the Wounded Knee by the main trail to the Rosebud Agency, leaving here at 4:40 P. M., and arriving there at about 8:30 P. M. Major Whitside’s Battalion of the 7th Cavalry and Detachment Light Battery E, 1st Artillery, had that day captured Big Foot’s band of Indians and when I arrived had them in his camp.  My command consisting of Regimental Headquarters and the Second Battalion detachment of Light Battery E, 1st Artillery went into camp for the night.  At about 7:30 the next morning after considerable trouble the bucks of Big Foot’s band—numbering 106, were collected away from their camp and—after explaining to them that, having surrendered, they would be treated as prisoners of war, but that as such they must surrender their arms,–squads of 20 men were cut off and told to bring them to a designated place.  The result of this was very unsatisfactory, but few arms being brought.  Keeping the bucks collected, details of soldiers were made, under officers, to search the Indian Camp.  While this was in progress, one Indian separated a little from the rest, and in Ghost Dance costume, began an address to which I paid no attention, as the Interpreter said he was telling the Indians to be quiet and submit.  After a short while however, the Interpreter told me that he was talking of wiping out the whites.  I then made him cease his address.  Just after this, the search through their camp having proved almost fruitless, I gave orders to search the persons of the bucks—again telling them that they must do as white men always do when surrendering—that is give up their arms.  At the first move to carry out the order last referred to, the bucks made a break, which at once resulted in terrific fire and a hot fight lasting about twenty minutes, followed by skirmish firing of about one hour.  From the first instant the squaws started for the hills and it is my belief that comparatively few of them were injured.  Some bucks succeeded in getting away, and three troops were sent in pursuit.  They overtook and captured five bucks (all badly wounded), nineteen squaws and children and killed six bucks.  Very soon after, the force was attacked by about 125 bucks, supposed to be from the Agency.  In the fight which followed, those captured had to be dropped.  One of the troops sent out became separated a short distance and killed four Indians, one a buck, the other three could not be determined.  As accurate an estimate as could be made of the dead Indian bucks in and near the camp was 83, which added to the 7 before mentioned makes 90 as the number of bucks killed.  The attack on the three troops by the 125 bucks—taken in connection with a message from the Department Commander to Major Henry, 9th Cavalry, who was on White River, which message was opened by me by mistake and contained the information that the Brules had left the Agency on the warpath—led me to believe that I was in danger of an attack by all the discontented Indians in the vicinity; and as my command had suffered greatly in killed and wounded, I deemed it not only prudent but obligatory in me to return to the Agency.  The task of caring for the killed and wounded, and improvising as comfortable transportation as possible for them, and making the other necessary arrangements, occupied all the time, and all the men of the command.  Fortunately a supply train came into camp just after the fight, which was emptied and utilized for this purpose.  As I saw a night march ahead of me, an early start was of utmost importance.  For this reason no time was taken to accurately count the killed and wounded Indians in and near the camp.  Another reason for this omission was the fact that one buck held a sheltered ravine which commanded a great portion of the field, and all our efforts to dislodge or kill him failed, although fully half an hour was spent in the effort.  He was wounded and I thought it better to leave him than to make additional sacrifices in order to take him, which loss would certainly have followed.  We brought with us to the Agency six bucks badly wounded and twenty-seven squaws and children wounded.
Forty-eight guns were secured many of which were issued to citizen teamsters and reporters during the fight and some were retaken by the bucks as their first rush was in that direction.  About one hundred and fifty ponies were captured and turned over to the Indian Scouts to be driven to the Agency.
Our loss was one officer (Captain Wallace), six non-commissioned officers and eighteen privates killed; and two officers (Lieuts. Garlington and Gresham, the latter slightly, 7th Cavalry, and Lieut. Hawthorne, 2d Artillery), eleven non-commissioned officers and twenty-two privates wounded.
In closing this report, I desire to express my admiration of the gallant conduct of my command in an engagement with a band of Indians in desperate condition and crazed by religious fanaticism.
Enclosed is a sketch of the ground where the fight took place.
Very respectfully, Your obdt servant,
James W. Forsyth,
Colonel 7th Cavalry Comdg,

Map furnished by Col. Forsyth, 7th Cav., of action of 29th Dec. 1890.

(Click to Enlarge) “Map furnished by Col. Forsyth, 7th Cav., of action of 29th Dec. 1890.” The map designates the left side of the map as “East.”  It is actually South.

Recapitulation [of casualties].

Whites.

Killed.
Capt. G. D. Wallace, 7th Cavalry
6 non-commissioned officers
18 Privates.

Wounded.
1st Lieut. E. A. Garlington, 7th Cavy.
1st Lieut. J. C. Gresham, 7th Cavy.
2nd Lieut. H. L. Hawthorne, 2d Arty
11 non-commissioned officers
22 Privates.

All were of the 7th Cavalry except Lieut. Hawthorne and Hospital Steward Oscar Pollack.

Indians.

Killed.
83 bucks in and near camp
7 bucks by pursuing party.

Wounded.
6 bucks brought to the agency,
5 bucks abandoned by pursuing party,
19 squaws and children abandoned by pursuing party,
27 squaws and children brought to Agency.

Colonel Forsyth also submitted on 31 December 1890 his report of the regiment’s actions of the previous day near the Drexel Catholic Mission on White Clay Creek.

Camp Pine Ridge Agency,
December 31, 1890.

Acting Assistant Adjutant General,
Headquarters Department of the Platte,
In the field,

Sir:–I have the honor to report

that in accordance with verbal orders of the Department Commander I moved out with my command (headquarters and eight troops of the 7th Cavalry and detachment of light battery E, 1st Artillery) to the Catholic Mission, about 4 ½ miles below the agency on White Clay creek.  My information from the Department Commander was that the hostile Indians had burned the Mission; but upon reaching that point I found that there had been a mistake, and that instead a small log building used for school purposes, about a mile this side of the Mission, was burning.  Father Jutz at the Mission told me that the school house had been fired by a small party of Brule Indians who had gone down the valley a few hours before; but that the Mission had not been molested in any way.  While at the Mission I saw two other fires down the valley, and proceeding in that direction, I developed a scattered force of about fifty Indians, who were well protected by the bluffs and ravines with which both sides of the valley are bordered.  By throwing forward two or three troops I succeeded in silencing the fire of the Indians and apparently in dispersing them over the bluffs on each side of the valley.  Just as one battalion was mounted and was withdrawing, a considerable number of Indians attacked us from the south toward the agency.  The mounted battalion quickly stationed and for about one half hour a very brisk fire was maintained on both sides.  The battalion which had been left at the first position was withdrawn to the second.  The portion of the valley in which we were attacked the second time, being narrow and controlled by the bluffs, was not suitable, and one battalion was again withdrawn under support of the other.  Four troops of the 9th Cavalry and detachment of light battery E, 1st Artillery now arrived under command of Major Henry, and supporting the advance battalion by his, it was withdrawn gradually up the valley.  From a new position–still, however, a contracted one–a number of shots were fired from the Hotchkiss guns, but as the Indians did not attempt any further attack, and as my men and horses and those of Major Henry’s battalion were much fatigued by thirty-six hours almost constant work, I, at about one hour and a half before dark, started for the agency.  Several Indians are believed from their actions to have been wounded or killed.  One saddled but riderless pony was seen running across the bottom from a point where a mounted Indian had just previously been seen.  The loss on our side was one private killed and one officer (Lieut. Mann) and 5 enlisted men wounded.  I have since learned that the main village, containing between seven and eight hundred bucks, was located three or four miles farther down the stream than my advance troop reached, and the slight resistance I met with was undoubtedly made with the hope that a rush would be attempted down the narrow valley, when, from the bluffs on each side, my command would have been almost at their mercy.

Very respectfully, Your obedient servant,

James W. Forsyth, Colonel 7th Cavalry, Commanding.

Citation: National Archives Microfilm Publications, “Reports and Correspondence Related to the Army Investigations of the Battle at Wounded Knee and to the Sioux Campaign of 1890–1891.” (Washington: The National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, 1975),757-763, and 819.

Citation for this article: Samuel L. Russell, “Col. Forsyth’s Official Reports of Actions at Wounded Knee,” Army at Wounded Knee (Sumter, SC: Russell Martial Research, 2013-2015, http://wp.me/p3NoJy-1z), updated 8 Feb 2015, accessed date __________.

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Major Whitside’s Official Report of the Capture of Big Foot’s Band

Posted on August 8, 2013 by Sam Russell

Major Samuel M. Whitside, 7th Cavalry, at Pine Ridge Agency, 16 Jan. 1891. Cropped from John C. H. Grabill's photograph, "The Fighting 7th Officers."

Major Samuel M. Whitside, 7th Cavalry, at Pine Ridge Agency, 16 Jan. 1891. Cropped from John C. H. Grabill’s photograph, “The Fighting 7th Officers.”

Following the battles of Wounded Knee Creek on 29 December and White Clay Creek on 30 December, and the military funeral of thirty 7th Cavalry troopers on 31 December, Major Samuel M. Whitside finally had an opportunity to write his official report of the capture of Chief Big Foot and his band of Miniconjou Lakota.

Jan. 1, 1891
7th Cavy. Camp
Pine Ridge Agency

Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report:

In compliance with instructions contained in letter from Commanding General Dept. of the Platte, dated Dec. 26, 1890, and endorsement thereon, by Colonel, 7th Cavalry, I left camp at Pine Ridge Agency, S. D., at 1:20 P.M., Dec. 26, ’90, with my battalion, consisting of Troops A, I, K, and B, 7th Cavy., and two Hotchkiss guns, in command of Lieut. H. L. Hawthorne, 2nd Arty., and proceeded to a point on Wounded Knee Creek known as the Post Office crossing, reaching there about 5:00 P.M., same date.  As I approached the creek, my scouts reported they had seen four (4) Indians who said they were “Sitting Bull people.”  I sent Troop “A”, 7th Cavy. under Capt. Moylan, 7th Cavy. forward at a gallop to try and capture them, but darkness prevented.  On Capt. Moylan’s return, I went into camp on the creek near the crossing.

The following morning, Dec. 27, ’90, I sent Lieut. E. A. Garlington, 7th Cavy., with twenty-one (21) men to scout down Wounded Knee Creek and ascertain if possible if any Indians had crossed during the night, and also to try and communicate with Major Henry, 9th Cavy.

Lieut. J. C. Gresham, 7th Cavy., with twenty-one (21) men, was sent up Wounded Knee Creek to the State line, with instructions to thoroughly scout that country and ascertain if any Indians had crossed the creek to my south during the night.

Lieut. Gresham returned about 4 P.M., and reported he had seen no signs of Indians.

Lieut. Garlington returned about 9 P.M., and reported he had been down Wounded Knee about 25 miles and could find no signs of either Indians or Henry’s command.

My Indian scouts were sent well out to the east, towards Porcupine Creek and returned about dark and reported they had seen no signs of Indians.

On the morning on the 28th I sent a half-breed scout known as “Little Bat,” who reported to me the evening before, (with Lieut. Preston, 9th Cav.) and 3 Indian scouts, with instructions to scout the country about the Porcupine and try and locate “Big Foot” who I felt confident was in that direction.

At 11 o’c. A. M., “Little Bat” came into camp and reported “Big Foot” on the Porcupine coming in my direction.  I immediately saddled up and took the trot in the direction of the Porcupine, sending “Little Bat” and 3 scouts ahead.  Within two miles of the Porcupine the Indians were seen on the hill halted.  I formed my command in double column of fours, dismounted and formed line to the front, placing the Hotchkiss guns in the centre, and then rode forward with Lieut. Nicholson, 7th Cavy.,  met the Indians. “Big Foot” who was riding in a wagon, being sick, then came to the front.  I demanded the surrender of his band.  In the meantime, 120 Indians, well armed, two-thirds mounted, the remainder dismounted, advanced in line.  Some Indians tried to ride around my flanks.  I ordered them to return to the band, which order they obeyed.  I informed “Big Foot” that they were my prisoners and I would take them to Wounded Knee and go into camp for the night.

After this I wrote a dispatch to the Dept. Commander announcing the capture, requesting that the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavy., be sent as re-enforcement to my command to arrive before daylight the following morning to assist in the disarming of the Indians, as I did not consider it safe to make the attempt to disarm them with my command; this dispatch I sent in by Lieuts. Nicholson, 7th Cavy., and Preston, 9th Cavy.

I then took up my march with 2 troops in advance, followed by the Indians, two troops bringing up the rear, and arrived at the Wounded Knee Crossing at 2:30 P.M., and went into camp, detailing 2 troops, A and I, to guard the Indians during the night, which was done by placing a chain of sentinels around their camp and the 2 Hotchkiss guns under Lieut. Hawthorne on the side of the hill overlooking the Indian village.

About 8:30 P.M. the same date, Colonel James W. Forsythe [sic], 7th Cavy., with the 2d Battalion of the regiment arrived and assumed command.

Maj. S. M. Whitside, 7th Cavalry

Source:  National Archives Microfilm Publications, “Reports and Correspondence Related to the Army Investigations of the Battle at Wounded Knee and to the Sioux Campaign of 1890–1891,” (Washington: The National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, 1975), 822–823.

Citation for article: Samuel L. Russell, “Major Whitside’s Official Report of the Capture of Big Foot’s Band,” Army at Wounded Knee ( Sumter, SC: Russell Martial Research, 2013-2015, http://wp.me/p3NoJy-19), updated 28 Sep 2013, accessed date __________.

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