Wounded Knee Investigation

If Forsyth was relieved because some squaws were killed, somebody had made a mistake, for squaws have been killed in every Indian war.

–General William T. Sherman, U.S. Army, Retired

 

Major General Nelson A. Miles, Commander of the Division of Missouri, telegraphed Major General John M. Schofield, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, on December 30, 1890 detailing all that he knew of the battle at Wounded Knee Creek. It was incomplete information. In his message, Miles does not appear to be displeased with the 7th Cavalry’s performance or the outcome of the battle indicating that, “their [the warriors’] severe loss at the hands of the 7th Cavalry may be a wholesome lesson to the other Sioux. . . . Their getting so near the Pine Ridge Agency just at this time has complicated the surrender of all the hostiles in the Bad Lands, which would have been consummated before this had it not occurred; still the severity of their loss at the hands of the troops may possibly bring favorable results.” Schofield replied, “Your dispatch . . . further encourages my hope and belief that you will soon master the situation. Give my thanks to the brave 7th Cavalry for their splendid conduct.”[1]

When General Miles sent his report to General Schofield he was unaware of the extent of the 7th Cavalry’s casualties. En route from Rapid City to Pine Ridge, Miles spent much of the afternoon and the night of December 30 at Chadron, Nebraska. Late in the evening he learned of the number of troopers killed and wounded the previous day, perhaps from newspaper accounts. Bad news did not age well with Miles, and he was livid that his subordinates had not informed him of all they knew, particularly since this lack of information made Miles’ report to Schofield incomplete at best, and deceptive at worst. Firing off a telegram at 10:30 p.m. to Brigadier General John R. Brooke, commanding the Department of the Platte and all forces at the Pine Ridge Reservation, Miles was curt with Brooke, “I hear that twenty-five men were killed and thirty-four wounded in fight with Seventh Cavalry. Some one seems to be suppressing facts. I have made my report to the Adjutant General of the Army on what is received regarding skirmish between Forsyth and Indians. State position of Forsyth’s command and also the other troops.” The newly learned facts clearly altered Miles’ view of the effect that Wounded Knee had on the other Indians. Where he reported to Schofield that the Indians’ severe loss may bring favorable results, Miles telegram to Brooke stated, “Whatever the circumstances of that fight with Big Foot may be it must have had the effect of increasing the hostile element very largely.”[2]

Clearly on the defensive Brooke responded thirty minutes later, “Your telegram about losses is not understood.” Realizing his error Brooke continued, “Yesterday Forsyth lost Captain Wallace and twenty-four men of the Seventh Cavalry and one Indian scout killed and Lieutenants Garlington, 7th Cavalry, and Hawthorne, 2nd Artillery, and thirty-six men wounded in the fight with Big Foot. I was sure I reported this to you last night, but it seems I did not, but sent it to General Ruger.” He offered his superior his apologies, “I regret that there was a mistake in sending to General Ruger the information which should have gone to you,” and then tried to smooth any ruffled feathers, “I feel that everything is going well here.” Brooke concluded his response with an excuse for half-measures, “I did telegraph you at 9:25 last night that Forsyth had about seventy killed and wounded.”[3]

General Brooke’s telegram from the previous evening was vague and the number of casualties listed appeared to refer to Indian casualties, not soldiers. Was Brooke’s failure to report to Miles an act of omission, or commission? The telegram he sent to General Thomas H. Ruger, commanding the Department of Dakota, the evening of December 29 was thorough and detailed the most accurate casualty numbers available at the time. So too was a similar telegram that Brooke sent to his own adjutant general at Fort Omaha. Brooke had been in almost constant telegraph communication with Miles throughout the day, but the telegram to Ruger was the only one sent from Brooke on the 29th. Perhaps Brooke was reluctant to send the startling casualty numbers to Miles and instead forwarded his report to Ruger in hopes that he would pass on the tragic numbers to their superior officer. Following the campaign, Brooke twice indicated that he thought in general that he should report to Ruger, as the disturbances were all within the territory of the Dakota department. However, Brooke’s correspondence throughout November and December 1890 demonstrates that he regularly reported to Miles, not Ruger. Intentional or not, Brooke’s failure to report accurate casualty numbers to Miles in a timely manner created, or at least added to, the negative view that the commanding general was developing toward the tragic outcome of Wounded Knee.

That night, December 30, Miles wrote a letter to his wife, Mary, the niece of the former commander-in-chief of the Army, Lieutenant General William T. Sherman, in which he did not hide the displeasure he felt toward his subordinates. “Two nights ago I thought I had the whole difficulty in my hand, and without the loss of a single life. But all my efforts to prevent a war appear to have been destroyed by the action of Lt. Col. [Edwin V.] Sumner and Col. [James W.] Forsyth.”[4]

General Miles’ ire turned exclusively toward Forsyth as the newspapers began circulating stories that sensationalized the battle and voiced severe criticism of the killing of non-combatants, some characterizing the affair as a “slaughter of innocents.” Many of these same papers leveled their criticism directly at the commanding general. For an ambitious man such as Nelson Miles, any negative publicity of his campaign was a personal attack on his character, an unjust attack for which he felt James Forsyth’s actions were to blame. By the first of the new year, Miles was sure that Forsyth’s handling of the entire incident was incompetent, if not criminal.[5]

On January 1, 1891, Miles telegraphed Schofield.

Your telegram of congratulations to the 7th Cavalry received, but as the action of the Colonel commanding will be a matter of serious consideration, and will undoubtedly be the subject of investigation, I thought it proper to advise you. In view of the above fact, do you wish your telegram transmitted as it was sent? It is stated that the disposition of four hundred soldiers and four pieces of artillery was fatally defective and large number of soldiers were killed and wounded by the fire from their own ranks and a very large number of women and children were killed in addition to the Indian men.[6]

The next day General Schofield concurred with Miles’ recommendation stating, “. . . please withhold it until further advised by me.” Later that day, Schofield passed Secretary Proctor’s instructions on to Miles.

He [the president] hopes that the report of the killing of women and children in the affair at Wounded Knee is unfounded, and directs that you cause an immediate inquiry to be made and report the results to the Department. If there was any unsoldierly conduct, you will relieve the responsible officer, and so use the troops engaged there as to avoid its repetition.[7]

Miles wasted no time in preparing for an investigation into Forsyth’s actions, and in fact had already set the wheels in motion the previous day by instructing Captain F. A. Whitney, 8th Infantry, to examine the battlefield and determine how many Indians were killed and wounded. Miles sent orders late on the night of January 2 for Major S. M. Whitside to accompany a burial party to Wounded Knee and assist the acting division engineer in making a detailed map of the battleground showing exact troop positions. Miles also sent his assistant inspector general, Major J. Ford Kent, and perhaps his closest protégé, Captain Frank D. Baldwin, to observe the battlefield and oversee Whitside’s work on the desired map. Whitside spent the next two days with Lieutenant Sydney A. Cloman, Acting Engineer Officer for the Division of the Missouri, detailing every aspect of the battlefield. While Whitside and Cloman surveyed the ground, a burial party went about the gruesome work of collecting the frozen Indian corpses and dumping them unceremoniously into a ditch where they were buried at a rate of two dollars a body.

Captain Folliott A. Whitney reported the number of Indian casualties remaining on the battleground on January 3, five days after the incident.[9]

Camp U.S. Troops.
Rosebud Crossing, Wounded Knee Creek,
January 3, 1891.

Acting Assistant Adjutant General.
Department of the Platte,
Pine Ridge Agency, S. D.

Sir: In compliance with instructions contained in your letter of January 1st, 1891, I have the honor to report that I have examined the ground where the fight with Big Foot’s band occurred, and counted the number of Indians killed and wounded, also number of ponies and horses with the following result:
82 bucks and 1 boy killed, 2 bucks badly wounded, 40 squaws killed, 1 squaw wounded, one blind squaw unhurt; 4 small children and 1 papoose killed, 40 bucks and 7 women killed in camp; 25 bucks, 10 women and 2 children in the canon [sic] near and on one side of the camp; the balance were found in the hills; 58 horses and ponies and 1 burro were found dead.
There is evidence that a great number of bodies have been removed. Since the snow, wagon tracks were made near where it is supposed dead or wounded Indians had been lying. The camp and bodies of the Indians had been more or less plundered before my command arrived here. I prohibited anything being removed from the bodies of the Indians or the camp.
I have not furnished a sketch or map of camp or vicinity, as Major Whitside arrived about noon to-day and informed me had an officer with him for this purpose.
Very respectfully, Your obedient servant,
F. A. Whitney,
Captain, 8th Infantry, Commanding Camp.[10]

In all the burial party interred 146 Indians at a cost to the government of $292. All the while, photographers recorded for posterity, the horrifying images of dead Indians frozen in their death throes. The slain Indians appeared even more grotesque as photographers turned their stiff corpses over, and in some cases posed them with weapons.

Whitside returned to the agency the following evening only to discover that he was now commanding the regiment. Miles’ aide-de-camp had delivered an order to Colonel Forsyth earlier in the day. “By direction of the President, you are hereby relieved from your present command, pending the inquiry to be made concerning the affair on Wounded Knee.” The same day Miles also issued orders establishing a board of inquiry to look into four charges against Forsyth.[12]

Headquarters Division of the Missouri, In the Field,
Pine Ridge, S.D., January 4, 1891.

Special Orders No. 8.
1. In order to comply with the telegraphic instructions of the President of the United States Colonel E. A. Carr, 6th Cavalry, Major Jacob F. Kent, 4th Infantry, A.I.G., and Captain Frank D. Baldwin, 5th Infantry, A.A.I.G., are hereby directed to make an immediate inquiry into, and examination of, all the circumstances and acts connected with the disarming of a band of Indians by troops under the command of Colonel James W. Forsyth, 7th Cavalry, encamped on Wounded Knee Creek, South Dakota, December 29th 1890.
They will ascertain whether the disposition made of the troops was judicious, and such as should be made to prevent unnecessary destruction of life while disarming the Indians, and whether the troops were so placed as to make their power most effective in case of resistance.
They will also ascertain whether any non-combatants were unnecessarily injured or destroyed, and whether orders that have been given, prohibiting commanding officers from allowing their commands to be mixed up with armed bodies of Indians, have been complied with.
They will render a full report of what was done with or by the commands in that affair, putting the result of their examination in such form as to render full and impartial justice to all concerned, and sustain the character and integrity of the service.
By command of Major General Miles:
Marion P. Maus, 1st Infantry,
Aide-de-camp.[13]

Miles notified Schofield the following day that he had relieved Forsyth, and inquired if his proposed inquiry met the President’s intentions. After discussing the matter with Proctor, Schofield fired back a message stating, “I am directed by the Secretary of War to inform you that it was not the intention of the President to appoint a court of inquiry…. You were expected yourself first to inquire into the facts and in the event of its being disclosed that there had been unsoldierly conduct, to relieve the responsible officer.”[14]

The relief of Colonel Forsyth and an investigation into Wounded Knee created a furor across the officer corps over action taken against a commander in the field while active campaigning continued, and the confusion over who directed the relief, played out in newspapers across the country. On January 5 the Evening Star ran an article detailing the atmosphere in the Nation’s capital over Forsyth’s relief.

The relief of Col. Forsythe [sic] of his command of the seventh cavalry by Gen. Miles, which has been telegraphed east from unofficial sources, forms the prevailing topic of conversation around the War Department today. It is being talked about with a vigor and an openness of criticism that reminds old timers of the war times, when shuch troubles were frequent. One officer said to a Star reporter: “At this rate the Sioux troubles will grow to be just as bad as events of the first three years of the [Civil] war, when every officer with an independent command had not only an enemy in front of him but a court-martial behind him.”
Officers say that it was a grave error to order the relief of Col. Forsythe at this stage of the proceedings, and thus hold up a warning finger to every colonel in the little army around Pine Ridge, to tell them that the death of each Sioux must be explained. It will have, it is openly asserted, a very demoralizing effect upon the enterprising bravery of the commanding officers in the field, and there are predictions that with the example that is being made of Col. Forsythe in full view there will hardly be a man in the army with any responsibility who will dare to do anything but take part in a negative campaign.
The true inwardness of Gen. Miles’ action in relieving Col. Forsythe has not yet come to light, but it is generally believed that this course was inspired by the officials here. Neither Secretary Proctor nor Gen. Schofield are willing to say very much on the subject, although both practically admit that Gen. Miles did not act entirely upon his own responsibility. Secretary Proctor said to a Star reporter: “Gen. Miles did it. It is a very much mixed up matter and I may explain it later.”[15]

Despite the apparent blunder in relieving Forsyth before determining the facts, Miles was not about to reinstate the cavalry colonel unless explicitly directed. On January 6, the day before the investigation began, Miles privately aired his low opinion of Forsyth in a letter to his wife. “Forsyth’s actions [are] about the worst I have ever known. I doubt if there is a Second Lieutenant who could not have made better disposition of 433 white soldiers and 40 Indian scouts, or could not have disarmed 118 Indians encumbered with 250 women and children.”[16] That same day he also relieved Colonel Carr from the board of inquiry owing to his continued active roll in containing the outbreak that was still ongoing. This left just Major Kent and Captain Baldwin on the board, creating an irregularity with both officers being junior to Colonel Forsyth. Had the outcome of the board resulted in formal charges and a general court martial against Forsyth, his defense certainly would have challenged the validity of the inquiry.

Headquarters Division of the Missouri In the Field,
Pine Ridge, S.D., January 6, 1891.

Special Orders No. 10.
4. Colonel Eugene A. Carr, 6th Cavalry, is hereby relieved from the operations of Paragraph 1, Special Orders No. 8, current series, these Headquarters, and will continue on his present duties.
5. Major Jacob F. Kent… and Captain Frank D. Baldwin… will proceed with the investigation contemplated… which will be conducted under the requirements of Army Regulations 945-946 of 1889.
By command of Major General Miles;
H.C. Corbin, Assistant Adjutant General.[17]

Major Jacob Ford Kent was a fifty-five-year-old infantry officer that had served continuously since graduating from the Military Academy in 1861. His service during the Civil War spanned from first Bull Run to the Siege of Petersburg. Kent was wounded in two engagements, captured in one, and awarded with brevets for gallantry twice, finishing the war as a captain in the 3rd Infantry with a brevet rank of lieutenant colonel. Following the war, he taught tactics at West Point for four years. He continued service with the 3rd on the frontier at posts from Fort Lyons, Colorado, to Fort Missoula, Montana. In 1885, Kent was promoted to major in the 4th Infantry and had served in that capacity at Fort Omaha, Nebraska, up to the campaign of 1890. Major Kent had served on numerous assignments as an assistant inspector general, his role during the Pine Ridge Campaign. Prior to the conclusion of the Wounded Knee investigation, Kent was promoted to lieutenant colonel in the 18th Infantry.[18]

Captain Frank Dwight Baldwin was a forty-eight-year-old officer on General Miles’ staff as the inspector of small arms practice. Assigned to the 5th Infantry, Miles’ former regiment, Baldwin had long been a confidant of the major general. The captain was a native Michigander, the state from which he entered the Volunteers during the Civil War. He distinguished himself several times in combat, particularly in action at Peach Tree, Georgia, in 1864, again at McClellan’s Creek and Red River, Texas, in 1874, and at Wolf Mountain, Montana, in 1877. For the first two engagements he was eventually awarded two Medals of Honor, the first issued in December 1891 while working on Miles’s staff. Baldwin was also awarded a brevet to captain for gallantry at Red River, and for the Wolf Mountain engagement, he was awarded a brevet promotion to major for gallantry. General Miles likely played a role in all four accolades, and personally made the recommendations for one of the Medals of Honor and both brevet promotions. Baldwin had been with the 5th Infantry since 1869 and a captain since 1879. For the purposes of the Wounded Knee inquiry, General Miles appointed Baldwin an acting assistant inspector general at the beginning of January 1891, an appointment Miles made just three days after the Wounded Knee Creek affair, and the day before he was instructed to look into “any unsoldierly conduct,” leading some officers to conclude that Miles was stacking the deck with officers more likely to render findings in accordance with the commanding general’s wishes than in rendering “full and impartial justice.”[19]

Many in the military circles believed the action Miles was taking against Forsyth was unjustified. Major Whitside wrote to his wife, “The settlement of the Indian trouble has been a failure according to the plans arranged by Gen. Miles, and now some one must shoulder the responsibility and be sacrificed and from appearances Gen. F[orsyth] is the man selected, for other people to unload on.” Forsyth recognized the scrutiny he faced in a letter to his daughter writing her, “From the time I got here I knew that some one would be selected as a scapegoat, for the character of the general officer running this thing indicated this, but I did not believe that I was to be selected by Providence to carry the load.” Some of the criticism came closer to Miles’ own home. The retired Commanding General of the Army, William T. Sherman, wrote on January 7 to his niece, who was also Miles’ wife, “If Forsyth was relieved because some squaws were killed, somebody had made a mistake, for squaws have been killed in every Indian war.” Sherman’s comment was not to insinuate that killing non-combatants was acceptable but rather to reinforce that no commander during the Indian Wars had been held accountable for the unavoidable deaths of women.[21]

That General Miles had already formed his opinion of what transpired at Wounded Knee before his investigation even began can be seen in a letter he wrote to the adjutant general of the army on January 5, 1891. He stated in part:

The report of Colonel Forsyth and accompanying map shows what dispositions he made, and the map, presents one erasible [sic] fact, namely, the commands were so placed that the fire must have been destructive to some of their own men, while other portions of the troops were so placed as to be non-effective. It also appears that after a large number of their arms (47) had been taken away from the Indians, the fight occurred between the troops and Indians in close proximity. The additional map places the troops in somewhat different position. These positions were indicated by Major Whitside, 7th Cavalry as at [the] time [the] fight commenced. Captain Wallace was killed with a war club, others were stabbed with knives, and bows and arrows were used.
The number of casualties were Captain Wallace and 24 men killed, Lieutenants Garlington, Gresham and Hawthorne and 33 men wounded. There were 82 Indian men killed and 64 women and children killed and buried on the ground, and four have since died of wounds, 30 Indians, including men, women and children, some wounded have reached the hostile camp on White Clay Creek, eight men, eleven women and sixteen children, all wounded and thirty women and children not wounded were brought to this place. Another body of Indians, numbering 63, 20 of whom were men, were captured on American Horse Creek, 25 miles from Wounded Knee by 15 scouts, and brought to this camp and disarmed without casualties occurring.
While the fight was in progress with Colonel Forsyth’s command, about 150 Brule Indians left camp then en-route from the Bad Lands to this agency, and went down to the assistance or rescue of the Big Foot Indians. The troops had then become widely separated in chasing the Indians, and this band of Brules attacked Captain Jackson, and recaptured 26 prisoners.[22]

Major J. Ford Kent and Captain Frank D. Baldwin began their investigation on January 7, 1891 by taking sworn testimony from officers and depositions from witnesses. Following was the evidence compiled by the board including the order in which the officers appeared before the two investigators.

Colonel James W. Forsyth’s field reports dated December 28, 29 and 31, 1890.

Major Samuel M. Whitside’s field report dated January 1, 1891.

First Lieutenant Sydney A. Cloman’s map of the Wounded Knee battlefield dated about January 5, 1891.

January 7, 1891 testimony: Major Samuel M. Whitside, Captain Myles Moylan, Captain Charles A. Varnum, First Lieutenant William J. Nicholson.

January 8, 1891 testimony: Captain John Van R. Hoff, Captain Edward S. Godfrey, Second Lieutenant Sedgwick Rice, First Lieutenant Charles W. Taylor.

January 9, 1891 testimony taken at camp on White Clay Creek: Captain Charles S. Ilsley, Captain Henry Jackson, Captain Winfield S. Edgerly, First Lieutenant William W. Robinson, Jr., Second Lieutenant Thomas Q. Donaldson, Second Lieutenant Selah R. H. Tompkins.

January 10, 1891 testimony: Captain Allyn Capron, Captain Henry J. NowlanCaptain Henry J. Nowlan, First Lieutenant Loyd S. McCormick, Captain Charles B. Ewing.

January 11, 1891 testimony: Major Samuel M. Whitside, Colonel James W. Forsyth.

Depositions: Scout Philip H. Wells, Frog (translated by Wells), Help Them, Father Francis M. J. Craft.

January 13, 1891 initial findings.

Colonel James W. Forsyth letter detailing experience in Indian engagements.

January 17, 1891 testimony: Brigadier General John R. Brooke.

January 18, 1891 final findings.

January 31, 1891: Major General Nelson A. Miles endorsement.

February 4, 1891: Major General John M. Schofield endorsement.

February 12, 1891: Secretary of War Redfield Proctor decision.